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1. Introduction
Economists have long neglected distribution issues within the household by considering the household as a 
homogeneous and harmonious decision-making unit where the spouses have equal power. .A well-known 
empirical fact is that women, in general, earn less than men. In 1986, the U.N. Commission on the Status of  
Women reported: While women represent half the global population and one-third of the labor force, they 
receive only one tenth of the world income ... . They are also responsible for two-thirds of all working hours 
(quoted in Folbre (1986, p. 22)). A substantial body of literature suggests that a woman's power within the 
household is related to her contribution to the household's financial resources (see Browning et al (1992) and 
Phipps and Burton (1992), for instance). 
Several studies suggest that a woman's power within household is related to her income. Empirical evidence 
presented here,  however,  suggests  that  spouses'  personal  spending levels  are  more  or  less  egalitarian in 
significantly many cases. In this paper, we provide a simple formal model to show, among other things, that 
an egalitarian intra-household division of surplus income under certain circumstances is consistent with the 
fact that women typically earn lower wages than men. In our model we focus on two sharing rules to divide 
the income surplus: egalitarian and proportional. In the former, the personal spending levels of the spouses 
are equal; in the latter, the ratio of these spending levels is equal to the ratio of their incomes. We consider A 
SIMPLE game where the husband decides whether to make an egalitarian offer or a proportional offer. 
Whichever offer he decides to make has to be accepted by the wife for all periods that follow; otherwise a 
divorce follows.
In our model, in the absence of complete and perfectly enforceable marital contracts, the egalitarian marriage 
(i.e., the efficient marriage with a complete or high degree of specialization in Becker (1985)'s framework) 
turns out to be an equilibrium outcome given certain parameters. 
There are circumstances under which the husband does not even settle for the egalitarian marriage and makes 
the proportional offer even if it is going to cause a divorce. As will be seen, the wife, unless the alimony is 
too generous, prefers an egalitarian marriage to any other outcome. When her alimony is low and divorce 
cost is high, she will accept even a proportional offer. In that case, a proportional marriage arises as the 
equilibrium outcome. Under some circumstances, the male chooses not to propose marriage.
In the two important initial papers on intra-household bargaining, Manser and Brown (1980) and McElroy 
and Horney (1981), used Nash's cooperative bargaining framework, where the threat point is the divorce 
outcome; consequently, any change in the threat point affects the distribution of utility within the marriage. 
Lundberg and Pollak (1993),  on the other  hand,  suggests  that  the  threat  point  need  not  be  the divorce 
outcome but an uncooperative marriage, in which spouses' contributions to the household public goods turn 
out  to  be  inefficient;  it  turns  out  that  the  intra-household  distribution  depends  on  who  controls  the 
household's resources. Becker (1985) examines time allocation within the marriage when home production 
and market production exhibit learning effects. The efficient outcome is specialization of tasks within the 
marriage,  which  is  made  possible  by  parties'  commitment  to  a  distribution through  the  course  of  their 
marriage via a prenuptial marriage contract in the marriage market. In Becker's model, the efficiency of time 
allocation is independent of the distribution within marriage due to the presence of complete and perfectly 
enforceable marital contracts. In a recent paper by Wells and Maher (1997), given a multi-period framework, 
spouses choose between allocating time to the household public good or career activities, both of which 
exhibit  learning  effects.  While  complete  specialization  is  efficient,  typically  the  outcome  of  this 
noncooperative setup turns out to be inefficient incomplete specialization. Wells and Maher (1997) and our 
paper are complementary in that their focus is on specialization and efficiency, whereas our focus is on the 
two sharing rules to divide the income surplus.
2. Empirical Evidence
To get an idea of income shares and the distribution of spending on self and spouse within the household and 
to measure proxies for dominance and happiness, a survey was conducted in Izmir, Turkey (see Cinar and 
Anbarci, 1998). Izmir is the third largest city in Turkey, with a population of 2.1 million residents. Table 1 
gives  the  descriptive  statistics  of  the  survey  sample. 
 
How does one measure power (defined as non-submissiveness or having a degree of control over one's life) 
or dominance within the household? Is it control over money and spending? In economics, the traditional 
proxy used for welfare is income and money. As a starting point, one can measure welfare or well-being of or 
power between spouses by assuming that power within the household is perfectly correlated with the income 
shares of husband and wife (see Browning et al (1992) and Phipps and Burton (1992)). In our sample, the 
number of women who earned more than their husbands in each of the socio-economic groups were 15 % in 
upper, 4 % in middle and 10 % in lower socio-economic groups. In total, 35 % of upper, 19 % of middle and 
20 % of  lower strata  women earned about the same or  more than their  husbands in  our  sample.  These 
numbers give one proxy of dominance within marriage.
(i) Egalitarian Outcome of Absolute Personal Expenditures:
Income, however, is not necessarily a good measure of dominance. Altruistic or otherwise, spending on the 
household and the children have to be deducted to see how much, if any, is being spent on one's self. Net 
expenditures on self can be a better indicator of dominance in the household. Personal expenditures (such as 
personal haircare, makeup, clothes, reading materials, personal use of the car) were tallied and the absolute 
amounts of spending were compared between husband and wife. 22 % of upper, 22 % of middle and 24 % of 
lower socio-economic strata women were found to have higher personal expenditures than men. In about 38 
% to 46 % of the time, men are found to have higher personal expenditures than women. In about 30 % to 40 
% of the households the expenditures are egalitarian (same). Thus, in about 54 % to 62 % of the households 
the personal expenditures are either egalitarian or favoring the women.
We find this result surprising. Most of the literature in developing countries cite that fathers tend to spend a 
great deal of the household income for their own personal expenditures. Our sample does not dispute this 
finding overall but shows that women with income spend on self at least as much as men in at least half the 
households across all three strata. Our finding says nothing about the priorities of women's spending. It could 
very well be that while some men spend on themselves regardless of the children, some women spend on 
children first and then spend the residual, if any, on themselves.
(ii) Proportional Outcome of Personal Expenditures:
Instead of the absolute value of personal expenditures, another proxy for dominance can be the proportional 
share of personal expenditures of husband and wife. That is, if we pool total household income and also total 
personal expenditures of husband and wife and compare the percentage of income shares to the percentage of 
personal expenditure shares, we can get another proxy for dominance. For example, a woman who earns 40 
% of the household income but has a personal expenditures share of less than 40 % would be considered 
submissive with respect to proportional outcome. 
We  found  the  majority  of  women  in  all  three  strata  to  be  more  dominant  than  men  with  respect  to 
proportional outcome. We found that 70 % of upper, 82 % of middle and 62 % of lower strata women have 
dominance greater than or equal to that of men in their marriage when dominance is defined with respect to 
proportional  outcome. However,  the dominance clearly observed for  these women (with respect to  both 
egalitarian and proportional outcomes) could be the result of non-dominance in other spheres of the marriage, 
where some women under stress find release in personal shopping. Another non-monetary measure of power 
could also be leisure time Yet the monetary proxies of dominance used so far are not totally inappropriate. In 
a separate question, 76 % of upper, 44 % of middle and 32 % of lower socio-economic household women 
responding to the survey declared that they could do 'whatever they wanted'. 40 %, 56 % and 48 % of the 
same groups stated that they were the dominant decision makers in the home.
3. The Model
We assume that both parties know all parameter values right from the outset (complete information). The 
husband decides whether to make an egalitarian or a proportional offer. Whichever offer he decides to make, 
it has to be accepted by the wife for all periods t  > 1; otherwise a divorce follows but the division of the 
surplus at t = 1 complies with the offer made by the husband.
We assume that the female works at a regular job at each t ≥ 1 that pays a normalized wage of 0 (which is 
sufficient to cover her subsistence level). The husband contributes a normalized amount of 0 to the public 
good within the marriage. The wife contributes to the public good by G* which enables the husband to earn a 
wage of W*. An egalitarian of  surplus income here means (1/2) W* for  each party  and a proportional 
distribution means 0 for the wife and W* for the husband. If divorce occurs, then at t = 2 the female and the 
male incur divorce costs, CF and CM respectively. These costs entail court costs as well as psychic and other 
costs due to divorce. The wife, being the party that provided G* to enable W* initially and because of her 
low potential wage, may also be entitled to a portion (0,1) of the man's after-divorce wage W each period t > 
1 following the divorce; thus, α W is the alimony. The wife after divorce will enjoy her contribution to the 
previously public (and now private) good G* solely.
In the normalized value functions below, E stands for egalitarian, P for proportional, Y for yes, and N for no 
(see endnote 1) :
VF(E,Y) = 1/2W*/(1- β ) VM(E,Y) = (1/2W* + G*)/(1-β )
VF(E,N) = 1/2W* + DF VM(E,N) = 1/2W* + G* + DM
VF(P,Y) = 0 VM(P,Y) = (W* + G*)/(1- β )
VF(P,N) = DF VM(P,N) = W* + G* + DM
The following lemma states the interrelationships among the various value functions:
LEMMA 0: (i) VF(E,N) > VF(P,N), and VF(E,Y) > VF(P,Y)
(ii) If 0 > DF , then VF(P,Y) > VF(P,N); otherwise, VF(P,Y) VF(P,N). 
(iii) If 1/2W*β /(1-β ) > DF , then VF(E,Y) > VF(E,N); otherwise, VF(E,Y) VF(E,N).
(iv) VM(P,Y) > VM(E,Y), , and VM(P,Y) > VM(P,N) > VM(E,N).
(v) If (1/2W*+G*)β /(1-β ) > DM , then VM(E,Y) > VM(E,N); otherwise, VM(E,Y) VM(E,N).
(vi) If (1/2W*(2β -1)+G*β )/(1- β ) > DM , then VM(E,Y) > VM(P,N); otherwise, VM(E,Y) VM(P,N).
(vii) The total welfare in (E,Y) and (P,Y) are the same. The total welfare in (E,N) and (P,N) are the same.  
The total welfare in any marriage is greater than in the break-up of the marriage.
The proof of this lemma follows from the definitions of VF(.),  VM(.) as well as from the values of the 
parameters in a straightforward way. Our concept of equilibrium is backward induction.
4. The Analysis of the Game
Lemma 1 will be useful in establishing our main result (see endnote 2). 
LEMMA 1: (i) If DF < 0, then the wife's dominant strategy is to accept any offer.
(ii) If 1/2W*β /(1-β ) > DF > 0, then the wife rejects the proportional offer but accepts the egalitarian offer.
(iii) If DF > 1/2W*β /(1-β ), then the wife's dominant strategy is to reject any offer.
(iv) If DM > (1/2W*(2β -1)+G*β )/(1-β ), then the husband's dominant strategy is to make the proportional  
offer. 
Our main result is as follows:
PROPOSITION 1: (i) If 0 > DF, then (P,Y) is the equilibrium outcome.
(ii) If  1/2W*β /(1-  β )  > DF  > 0 and (1/2W*(2β -1)+G*β )/(1-β )  > DM, then (E,Y) is the equilibrium 
outcome.
(iii) If DM > (1/2W*(2β -1)+G*β )/(1- β ) and DF > 0, then (P,N) is the equilibrium outcome.
(iv) If DF > 1/2W*β /(1-β ), then (P,N) is the equilibrium outcome.
(v) (E,N) is never an equilibrium outcome.
5. Conclusion
Women earn less than men in general, and a woman's power within a household is presumably related to her 
income level. Our empirical results, based on the survey conducted on two income households from Izmir, 
Turkey, indicate that the division of surplus income is more or less egalitarian in many cases. This, however, 
does not necessarily imply egalitarian personal leisure times.
Here,  we have  provided  a  model  which,  among other  things,  shows that  an  egalitarian  intra-household 
distribution under certain circumstances is consistent with the fact that women earn lower wages than men. In 
our model, one crucial element is the link between the marital wage premium for the husband and the wife's 
contribution to the public good. To a large extent, this link and the fact that the divorce (and the stigma of 
divorce) removes this marital wage premium drive our results.
In our model,  depending on the circumstances,  either division of surplus income (as well  as absence of 
marriage and divorce) can arise in equilibrium. As mentioned before, the egalitarian marriage is not the 
husband's first choice; when the wife would rather have a divorce than a proportional marriage, the husband 
settles for the egalitarian marriage in order not to lose his high marital wage premium and the wife's high 
contribution to the public good due to divorce.
One possible extension is to incorporate personal leisure levels,  possibly using a measure of dominance 
which  combines  the  levels  of  personal  expenditures  as  well  as  leisure  time.  One  can  also  consider 
incorporating a remarriage market. A fruitful direction for extension would be to include the possibility of 
domestic violence which can influence the type of division within the marriage.
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End Note
1. The original value functions are: UF(E,Y) = 1/2W*/(1-β ) + G*/(1-β ), UM(E,Y) = (1/2W* + G*)/(1- β ); UF(E,N) = 1/2W* + 
G*/(1-β ) + β α W/(1- β )- β CF, UM(E,N) = 1/2W* + G* + β (1-α ) W/(1- β )- β CM; UF(P,Y) = G*/(1- β ), UM(P,Y) = (W* + 
G*)/(1- β ); UF(P,N) = G*/(1- β ) + β α W/(1- β )- β CF, UM(P,N) = W* + G* + β (1-α )W/(1-β )- β CM. Observe that G*/(1-β ) 
appears in each UF(.). Thus, for simplicity, we can normalize each UF( .) by subtracting G*/(1-β ). Also, whenever convenient, we 
can abbreviate the present value of the wife's 'divorce' payoff β α W/(1- β )- β CF by DF, and the present value of the husband's 
'divorce' payoff β (1-α )W/(1- β )- β CM by DM. Hence, we will use the following simplified value functions.
2. Proofs of results can be obtained from authors.
 
Bibliography
Anbarci,  N. (1993),  Noncooperative Foundations of the Area Monotonic Solution,  Quarterly Journal of  
Economics, 108, 245-58. 
Anbarci,  N. (1995), Reference Functions and Balanced Concessions in Bargaining,  Canadian Journal of  
Economics,28, 675-82.
Anbarci, N. and J.P. Bigelow (1994), The Area Monotonic Solution to the Cooperative Bargaining Problem, 
Mathematical Social Sciences, 28, 133-42.
Anbarci,  N. and E.M. Cinar (1997), Intra-Household Division of Surplus Income: Theory and Evidence, 
Working Paper No. 97-8, Department of Economics, Florida International University.
Becker, G. (1985), Human Capital Effort and Sexual Division of Labor: Part 1, Journal of Labor Economics, 
3, S33-S58.
Bergstrom, T. (1996), Economics in a Family Way, Journal of Economic Literature, 34, 1903-34.
Bigelow,  J.P.  and  N.  Anbarci  (1993),  Non-Dictatorial,  Pareto-Monotonic,  Cooperative  Bargaining:  An 
Impossibility Theorem, European Journal of Political Economy, 9, 551-558.
Browning,  M.,  F.  Bourgouignon,  P.A.  Chiappori,  and  V.  Lechene  (1994),  Income  and  Outcomes:  A 
Structural Model of Intra-household Allocation, Journal of Political Economy, 102, 1067-96.
Cinar, E. M. and N. Anbarci, (1998), Measuring Spousal Power Within Two-Income Turkish Households, 
Working Paper, Department of Economics, Loyola University Chicago. 
Cinar, E.M. (1994), Unskilled Urban Migrant Women and Disguised Employment: Home-Working Women 
in Istanbul, Turkey, World Development, 22, 369-80.
Folbre, N. (1986), Cleaning House: New Perspectives on Households and economic Development, Journal  
of Economic Development, 22, 5-40.
Hersch, J. and L. Stratton (1997b), Household Specialization and the Male Marriage Wage Premium, mimeo.
Kazgan,  G.  (1978),  Women's  Labor  Force  Participation,  Job  Distribution,  Education  Level  and  Socio-
Economic Status in the Turkish Economy (in Turkish), in N. Abadan-Unat, ed.,  Turk Toplumunda Kadin 
(Ankara: Turk SosyalBilimler Dernegi). 
Kuyas, N. (1982), The Effects of Female Labor on Power Relations in the Urban Turkish Family, in C. 
Kagitcibasi, ed., Sex Roles, Family and Community in Turkey (Bloomington: Indiana University Press).
Lazear, E. and R.T. Michael (1988), The Allocation of Income within the Household (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press).
Lundberg, S. and R.A. Pollak (1993), Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market,  Journal of  
Political Economy, 101, 998-1010.
Lundberg,  S.  and R.A.  Pollak (1996),  Bargaining and Distribution in  a  Marriage,  Journal  of  Economic 
Perspectives, 10, 139-158.
Manser,  M. and  M. Brown (1980),  Marriage  and Household  Decision Making:  A Bargaining  Analysis, 
International Economic Review, 21, 31-44.
McElroy, M..B. and M.J. Horney (1981), Nash Bargained Household Decisions,  International Economic 
Review, 22,333-49.
Phipps, S. and P. Burton (1992), What is Mine is Yours? The Influence of Male and Female Incomes on 
Patterns  of  Household  Expenditure,  Discussion  Paper  No.  92-12,  Department  of  Economics,  Dalhousie 
University.
Phipps,  S.  and P.  Burton (1995), Sharing within Families:  Implications for the Measurement fo Poverty 
among Individuals in Canada, Canadian Journal of Economics, 28, 177-204.
Pollak,  R.A.  (1985),  A  Transaction  Cost  Approach  to  Families  and  Households,  Journal  of  Economic 
Literature, 23,581-608
Tauchen, H.V., A. Witte, and S.K. Long (1991), Domestic Violence: A Nonrandom Affair,  International  
Economic Review, 32, 491-511.
Wells, R. and M. Maher (1997), Time and Surplus Allocation Within Marriage, mimeo.
